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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LOWELL L. BRADY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

j

vs
JOHN E . FAUSETT and
GEORGE L. SMITH,

Case No. 14131

Defendants; and Respondents.

)

RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL
***

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks the court
to determine the option portion of an "Agreement To Sell
Cattle And Lease Land With Option To Purchase" to be unenforceable.

Defendants seek to uphold the validity of the

entire agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock,
sitting without a jury, the court found the agreement between
the parties to be valid and enforceable in every respect,
and decreed that defendants were entitled to specific
performance of the option should they elect to exercise the
same.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the judgment of the District
Court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is misleading and
inaccurate.

It assumes numerous factual matters which were

in dispute and which were contrary to the weight of the
evidence.

It omits to include a number of very material

and uncontroverted facts.

It quotes numerous bits of

testimony out of context.

And it is filled with statements

and conclusions not supported by the evidence.

For this

reason the respondents desire to make their own statement of
facts covering the facts that are relevant and material to
the issues in this appeal.
The defendant John E. Fausett (hereinafter referred to
as Fausett) is a rancher residing in North Duchesne, Utah
(T-6).

He became acquainted with the plaintiff Lowell L. Brady

(hereinafter referred to as Brady) in approximately February
of 1972 (T-7).

Shortly thereafter Brady approached Fausett

about purchasing a ranch in Colorado and their discussions led
to a transaction in April of 1972 wherein Fausett purchased a
ranch from Brady (T-9).

After this initial ranch purchase

Fausett and Brady became friends. At that time Brady's wife
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was confined in a rest home near Roosevelt, Utah (T-9).
Brady, who resided in Colorado, was making numerous trips
to Roosevelt to visit his wife and as a courtesy to him,
Fausett offered to let him stay at his ranch in North
Duchesne (T-9).

From the period of April 1972 until July

1972 Brady stayed overnight on the Fausett ranch thirtyfive to forty nights (T-9).

During this time their friend-

ship grew and Fausett made several trips to Brady's ranch
in Colorado to help him out with his ranching operations
(T-11,23).

Brady's own son who lived on an adjoining ranch

wouldn't help him or otherwise have anything to do with him
because of a deal between them that Brady had reneged on
(T-11,421,
During the time that Brady was visiting Fausett's
ranch they talked steadily about Fausett purchasing Brady's
cattle and also purchasing Brady's ranch in Colorado (T-13).
Brady's wife died on June 6, 1972 (T-20), after which Brady
became more serious and more persuasive about wanting to
sell the ranch.

On one occasion he flagged Fausett down on

the highway when the parties were traveling in opposite
directions and said "Johnny, can't you come over there and
buy that place, lease it, take it over, do anything?" (T-26).
Fausett told him that he couldn't afford the ranch and that
he did not think Brady should be selling it so soon after his
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wife had passed away (T-26).

Following that incident there

were many discussions about the purchase of the ranch (T-28)
the last and most significant of which was a discussion
which took place on the evening of July 24, 1972. On that
evening Brady was urging Fausett to lease his ranch in
Colorado for $25,000.00 per year (T-29,257).

Fausett told

Brady that under no circumstances was he interested in a
lease.

He explained that he had had a bad experience with

the Ute Indian Tribe on a previous lease where he had spent
a great deal of money and had done a lot of improvement work
and then had his lease cancelled (T-29,257).

He further

explained that the Brady ranch was in a run-down condition;
that it needed fencing, corrals, and other improvements, and
that he simply was not interested in putting in his time and
effort into a place that had been neglected for years and
years on a lease basis (T-29,257).

Brady then asked if Fausett

would lease the property if he were guaranteed an option to
buy (T-29,257).

Fausett said he would be interested if he

could get financial backing and that evening telephoned
George L.. Smith in Salt Lake City.

Smith told Fausett over

the telephone that he thought they could get the financing
(T-29,257).
Brady then arranged for the parties to meet with his
attorney, Hugh Colton, the next day in Vernal, Utah (T-29).
Mr. Colton had been Brady's attorney for many years and had
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represented him in many matters since 1928 (T-134,239).
The meeting was attended by Fausett, Smith, Brady and
Attorney Colton (T-68).

The defendants Fausett and Smith

were unrepresented by counsel (T-35,248).

Prior to the

meeting Brady had also discussed the transaction with his
accountant, Mr. Siddoway, (T-258).

At the meeting the

terms of the proposed transaction were discussed and Brady
instructed his attorney to draw up a five year lease with
option to purchase (T-253).
the option price.

There was some discussion on

Fausett thought the price should be

$260,000.00 and Brady was asking $300,000.00 (T-259).

After

some discussion Brady proposed that they split the difference
and the option price of $280,000.00 was agreed upon (T-14,259).
At the July 25 meeting there was also discussion
about the property to be included.

Fausett denies that there

was ever any discussion about Brady wanting to take care of
his daughters (T-15).

However, Brady did make a statement

about wanting to keep a little area around the Milner cabin
(T-15).

According to the testimony of Fausett, Smith would

not agree to this and told Brady he could use the property
during his lifetime but that he didn't want to fight with his
children after he was dead, whereupon Brady advised his
attorney to make a clean deal (T-25), meaning to include all
of the property.

Mr. Colton substantiated this testimony

stating that he recalls that Smith would not agree to any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property being withheld from the deal (T-242).

It was clearly

Colton's understanding that the transaction was to include all
property owned by Brady in Colorado (T-250,252).

Later when

it became necessary to obtain legal descriptions for B.L.M.
purposes he advised Fausett the descriptions could be obtained
by taking all of Brady's property descriptions and simply
deducting the land previously sold under contract to Fausett
and to Brady's son (T-250).
Following the meeting on July 25 Mr. Colton prepared
the "Agreement To Sell Cattle And Lease Land With Option To
Purchase" (inasmuch as this agreement is the subject of the
lawsuit a full and complete copy of the same is set forth in
Appendix "A" of this brief).

Fausett and Brady met in Colton's

office on July 29th and the agreement was signed (T-81,245).
Prior to the signing Brady had consulted with his Attorney Mr.
Colton privately about the agreement (T-135).

Smith was not

in Vernal on the 29th and copies were mailed to him in Salt
Lake City (T-246).
Between the meeting in Mr. Colton's office of July 25
and the time the agreement was signed on July 29 another
conversation was held between Brady and Fausett wherein
Brady told Fausett he didn't want to go through with the deal.
Fausett immediately offered to forget the deal and Brady said
"Let's not get hasty" and that "I don't think that I better
back out" (T-262).
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The written agreement between the parties provided
that the seller Brady was the owner of "a cattle ranch, and
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio
Blanco and Garfield Counties, Colorado, which he is desirous
of selling" (R-106, Exhibit 18; See also Appendix "A" to
this Brief).

It then provided at Page 3 that the said land

leased herein is described as follows:
placed here".

"Description will be

The reasons the property descriptions were

omitted from the written agreement was because Brady's
abstracts were not available and were being held by Connecticut
General Insurance Company in Denver (T-128,243).

Brady was

supposed to assist Mr. Colton in obtaining the abstracts so
that the legal descriptions could be supplied (T-128).

There

is nothing whatsoever in the record to even remotely suggest
that the descriptions were withheld because the parties could
not agree upon the land to be included.

Nor does this provide

any basis upon which to conclude that the agreements were
prepared in haste as has been argued in appellant's brief.
After the signing of the written agreement on July 29th
the defendants Fausett and Smith took possession of the
entirety of the Brady property and have exercised dominion and
control over it ever since that date (T-121,292).

They have

constructed improvements to the property consisting of sewer
lines, water systems, wells, corrals, reservoirs, roads, landfill, and flood drainage work (T-293,295).

-7-

The value of these
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

improvements will be approximately $76,000.00 (T-294).

In

addition they have purchased a sprinkling system at a cost
of $10,000.00 (T-293); ran power to the property at a cost
of $6,731.70 (T-294); and expended approximately $36,000.00
worth of caterpillar work (T-295).
Brady acknowledged in his testimony that the defendants Fausett and Smith have lived up to all of the terms
of the agreement (T-143).

He acknowledges receipt of

$50,000.00 on July 29, 1972 which was the initial down payment under the contract (T-120).

Thereafter he received an

additional draft of $2,230.00 on August 30, 1972 (T-122);
$2,230.00 on September 25, 1972 (T-123); and $2,330.00 on
October 29, 1972 (T-123); all being pursuant to the agreement
(T-123).

After the final roundup of cattle in the fall of

1972 the defendants Fausett and Smith paid Brady an additional
$166,400.00 representing the final payment for cattle under
the agreement (T-124).

Thereafter on January 8, 1973 the

defendants paid Brady $25,000.00 representing the lease payment for the ranch for the year 1973 (T-125).

On approximately

December 28, 1973 Brady was paid an additional $25,000.00
representing the lease payment for the ranch for the year
1974 (T-126).

And in December of 1974 Brady was paid

$25,000.00 representing the lease payment for the ranch for
the year 1975 (T-127).

Thus, under the very agreement that

Brady seeks the court to declare unenforceable he has been
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paid a total of $298,190.00, none of which has ever been
tendered back to the defendants, and substantial portions
of which were received even after the filing of this lawsuit.
At the time of the roundup of cattle in the fall of
1972 a short addendum contract was entered into between the
parties relating primarily to the final settlement on the
purchase of cattle (R-163).

The date of the addendum contract

was October 29, 1972, which was some three months after
Fausett and Smith had taken full possession of all of Brady's
Colorado property.

The addendum was signed by Lois B. Adams,

Brady's daughter, who was acting as his attorney-in-fact.
Brady acknowledged that his daughter had been given full
authority to sign the agreement (T-129).

The addendum contract

contained the following language:
"The parties hereby adopt all of the provisions
of the initial contract and again reaffirm the
same except as they are specifically amended
and changed by this addendum."
On Page 19 of Appellant's brief reference is made to
erroneous descriptions of property which appear in Bureau of
Land Management files (R-103, Exhibit 12).

Respondents place

no significance at all to these descriptions.

Fausett

testified that he followed up in transferring Brady's B.L.M.
grazing rights to himself and Smith, but that he did not at
any time furnish any legal descriptions to the B.L.M. (T-19).
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Statements in Appellant's brief about Brady being
ill at the time of the initial agreement and mentally
incapable of making rational decisions result solely from
self-serving statements of Brady and members of his family.
The only diagnosed illness of Brady was a prostate problem
(T-43,120).
(TT-120) ,

He had been going to doctors for medication

but counsel did not see fit to call any doctors to

testify at the trial.

Brady's Attorney, Mr. Colton, was

called as a witness by the defendants.

Counsel for Brady

had full opportunity to cross examine him and the question
of Brady's competence during the course of the negotiations
wasn't even brought up.

Fausett also affirmatively testified

that during the week of negotiations prior to the 25th and
29th of July, 1972 there was nothing wrong with Brady (T-265).
He had been staying at Fausett's ranch and eating "like a
horse11 (T-266) , At the time the contract was actually signed
he appeared to be in good spirits and there was some kidding
and teasing going on as to Brady's planned trip to Las Vegas
and the Go-Go girls there (T-264)•

No evidence was offered

by Brady, and so far as respondents were aware no claim has
been made, that the option price was unfair or not in
accordance with the market value of the land.
After hearing all of the evidence in the case the
trial court from his advantage position found that Brady was
fully competent at the time he entered into the agreement of
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July 25, 1972; that he advised by competent counsel and
freely, voluntarily, and understandingly dealt with Fausett
and Smith in an arms length transaction; and that there was
no fraud, undue influence or any unconscionable advantage
taken or committed by Fausett or Smith in any manner whatsoever (R-77)•

The court further found that there was a

meeting of the minds and no misunderstanding whatever between
the parties as to the property to be included in the lease
and option, of which the defendants had taken possession, and
that said property consisted of all of the property owned by
Brady in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties, less the property
previously sold under contract (R-77).

Based upon these

findings the court found the agreement of July 25, 1972 to be
in full force and effect and decreed that defendants Fausett
and Smith are entitled to specific performance of the option
should they subsequently elect to exercise it (R-75).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN EQUITY CASES THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.
Appellant Brady has alleged in his brief that under
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution the court
in equity cases may review questions of both law and fact.
Defendants do not dispute that principle, but merely point
out that the scope of review in equity cases has been clearly
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defined in prior adjudications of the court.

The findings

of the trial court will only be upset if the evidence clearly
preponderates against them.

Such findings are presumed to be

correct; the burden is upon the appellant to show they were
in error; and where the evidence is in conflict they will not
be disturbed merely because the Supreme Court may have reviewed
the matter differentlyf

Del Porto vs. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286,

495 P.2d 811. The reasons for this rule are summarized in the
following language of the court taken from Nokes vs. Continental
Mining and Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954:
" Where there is a conflict in the evidence,
the finding of the trial court will not be
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence
thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor, even
if its weight is slightly against the finding of the trial court, but it will be overturned and another finding made only if the
evidence clearly preponderates against his
finding.
The rule just stated is based upon the
sound reasoning that some credit should be
indulged in favor of the findings of the
trial court because of the advantages peculiar to his position in immediate contract with the trial. It is indeed often
true that, "the manner hath more eloquence
than naked words portend." There are intangibles of expression and attitude which
give color and meaning not apparent from
words alone. The trial judge feels the
impact of the personalities of the parties
and the witnesses: He is able to observe
their appearance and behavior; their forthrightness or hesitancy in answering; their
frankness and candor, or lack of it.
Similarly revealing to him are indications
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of surprise/-anger, resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other emotions which
may be discerned from expressions of the
countenance or voice. He also has some
advantage in appraising their abilities
to understand and their capacities to
remember. Furthermore, he is in a position
to question the witness himself to clarify
doubtful points or verify his impressions
on the matters just mentioned. All of this
combines to afford him better insight as to
the truthfulness of the testimony offered
than does a perusal of the cold record. It
is a sound and well recognized policy of the
law to repose some confidence in the verity
of the actions of the trial court, and not
to interfere with them unless it clearly
appears that he is in error."
See also Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 P. 2d 802;
Metropolitan Investment Company v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36,
376 P. 2d 940.

There is nothing in the record of the

instant case to show that the trial court misapplied any
proven facts or made any findings against the weight of
the evidence.
POINT II
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE CONTRACT IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT.
Inasmuch as this case involves a contract made in
Utah between Utah residents for the lease and purchase of
real property in the State of Colorado, the question may
arise as to whether Utah or Colorado Taw applies.

The general

rule is to the effect that in actions involving real property,
the lex loci rei sitae, or the law of the state where the land
is situated is controlling.
Section. 14, et seq.

16 Am. Jur. 2d, Conflict of Laws,

This may riot be very significant, as the

authorities from both Utah and Colorado, as well as the law
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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generally, support the position of the respondents.
A.

The General Law.

The law recognizes that much

less certainty and strictness in the description of property
is demanded in a contract for sale of land than in a deed.
United Truckmen vs. Larentz (Cal.), 249 P. 2d 352; Ralston vs.
Lebrain (Cal.), 248 P. 2d 810; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, Section 8.

All that is required in a contract of sale

is that the land be described with reasonable certainty or
furnish the means by which the land can be identified with
reasonable certainty.

See exhaustive annotation, 23 A.L.R. 2d 6,

Sufficiency of Description of Designation of Land in Contract or
Memorandum of Sale under Statute of Frauds; also 55 Am. Jur.,
Vendor and Purchaser, Section 8.

Under said rule, the following

types of descriptions have been held sufficient to meet the
Statute of Frauds and compel specific performance of a contract:
"Fleming Farm on French Creek."

Ross vs. Baker,

72 Pa. 186.
"Lands Campbell sold to said Preece situated in Shanty
Ranch."

Campbell vs. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S.W. 373.
"The lot sold to him in Zoar, Massachusetts."

Miller vs. Burt, 196 Mass. 395, 82 N.E. 39.
"Have sold a tract of land on Laurel Fork, Morgan
County, to party of the second part, Roe Wheeler for $900.00*"
Wheeler vs. Keeton, 242 S.W. 2d 1013.
"A horse and lot of land situated on Amity Street, Lynn,
Massachusetts."

Hurley vs. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 96 Am. Dec. 671.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Land at Sites consisting of 3,281 1/2 acres."
76 F. 525.
"80 acres of land 1 3/4 miles N. of Merwin, Bates
County, Mo."

Tracy vs. Berridge, 180 Mo. App. 220, 167

S.W. 1176.
"Enfield property."
no other property.

Where defendant held title to

Packer vs. Putnam, 57 N.H. 43.

"83 acre farm in Brunfield."

Schafer vs. Faylor,

(Ohio) 60 N.E. 2d 339.
"Homestead farm situated on both sides of Quidnick
Pond Road, so called."

Capwell vs. Spencer, 48 R.I. 401,

137 A. 699.
"Watts Street house."

Harper vs. Battle, 180 N.C.

375, 104 S.E. 658.
"Property situated on Sackman Street between Lavonia
and Riverdale Avenue."

Miller vs. Tuck, 88 N.Y. Supp. 495.

"The farm on which I now live."

Bateman vs. Hopkins,

157 N. Car. 470, 73 S.E. 133.
"The home place, 80 acres."

Davis vs. Davis, 171 Ark.

168, 283 S.W. 360.
"My home place and storehouse."

Henderson vs. Perkins,

94 Ky. 207, 21 S.W. 1035.
"The farm of Mrs. Lula Foor, wife of J. M. Foor, located
about 2 1/2 miles from Ensor, where Mrs. Foor now lives."
Foor vs. Mechanics Bank & Trust Company, 144 Ky. 682, 139 S.W. 840.
"E. H. Sherwood's barn and lot, Seventeenth and Davenport."

Ballou
Sherwood,
32 Neb.
666,
49 N.W.
790.
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.'•'• "Store No. 32 Market Square which I own,"

Coates vs.

Lunt, 210 Mass. 314, 96 N.E. 685.
"Their plantation located on Carson Lake, in the
Osceola District of Mississippi County, Arkansas."

Miller vs.

Dargan, 136 Ark. 237, 206 S.W. 319.
"Our Roscoe Farm."

Bennett vs. Palmer, 128 111. App. 626.

"My farm, known as the Jno Baskett Home Farm."
Posey vs. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S.W. 703.
"Whatever lots or lands which may be owned by the said
parties of the first part in the plat of Montville aforesaid."
St. Paul Land Company vs. Dayton.

42 Minn. 73, 43 N.W. 782.

Reference is made to the A.L.R. annotation cited above
for numerous other examples.
B.

The Utah Authorities.

In step with the law generally

are the decisions from Utah involving the sufficiency of a
legal description.

Typical cases are as follows:

In Eastman vs. Thatcher, 7 Utah 99, 25 P. 728, a
description of property as a "one-half interest of Hyrum
Thatcher, of Logan, Utah, in horses and ranch, etc." is a
sufficient legal description for specific performance where
it appears from parol evidence that Hyrum Thatcher owned a
one-half interest in but one ranch.
In Johnson vs. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P. 2d 893, it
was held that an agreement for the sale of an apartment house
by street address, without indicating in what city, county or
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state the property was situated, was not so uncertain as
to preclude specific performance, where the defendant
admitted he owned property at a certain stated address in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The court also held that extrinsic

evidence may be introduced to show the exact boundaries and
location of property mentioned in the contract of sale and
cited the following language from Cummings vs. Nielson,
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619:
"It is elementary that in equity that
is certain which can be made certain. In
case . . . certain lands are mentioned by
name merely in a contract, without giving
a definite description, the . . . lands
intended by the contract may always be
shown by extrinsic parol or documentary
evidence. See also Pomeroy's Specific
Performance of Contracts, 3d Edition,
Section 152."
In Nielsen vs. Rucker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 333 P. 2d 1067,
the court specifically enforced a contract wherein the
property was described as "the dairy farm owned by Glen Nielsen
and wife."

The evidence established that the dairy farm in

question was the only farm that the Nielsens owned in Brigham
City, Utah, or elsewhere.

In upholding the contract, the court

again cited the same language from the Cummings vs. Nielsen
case as set forth above.
The appellant in this case has relied heavily upon the
recent case of Davison vs. Robins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P. 2d 1026
wherein the court refused to specifically enforce a contract
for lack of a sufficient legal description.

The reason why

the contract failed in the Davison case is because the sale
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by its terms was not intended to include all of seller's
land, and the portions to be excluded were subject to
additional negotiation.

In reaching its result, the court

stated as follows:
"In the instant action, the agreement in
clear and unambiguous terms provided that
the location and description of the land to
be conveyed was subject to the future mutual
agreement of the parties. This writing
constituted a mere expression of a purpose
to make a contract in the future, for the
whole matter was contingent on further
negotiations. The trial court erred in its
conclusion that the writing constituted a
valid enforceable contract."
Under no stretch of the imagination can the Davison case
be construed to reverse all of the prior case law in the
State of Utah, nor does it purport to do so.

It is clearly

distinguishable from the case at bar in that according to
the findings of the court the contract between plaintiff and
defendants in the instant case included all of plaintiff's
land thereby leaving nothing open for future negotiation.
C.

The Colorado Authorities.

Colorado, likewise,

follows the general law with respect to sufficiency of legal
descriptions.

An early Colorado case, Ross vs. Purse, 28 P.

473, wherein no county or state was mentioned in a legal
description established the general rule.

There it was

stated as follows:
"If the writing contains indicia by
reference to which, coupled with the
defective designation otherwise, the
identity of the premises can reasonably
be determined, specific performance may
be
decreed."
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The Ross case has been cited in various other Colorado
decisions, among which is Boyd vs. McElroy, 100 P. 2d 624.
In the Boyd case, specific performance was decreed in a suit
involving a lease with an option to purchase in which the
property was described as "my homestead and additional land
joining same of 440 acres."

The court said:

"Everyone

connected with the deal knew what land was involved, and at
the trial, the court permitted the description to be read
into the record from the County Clerk's records."
Other Colorado cases holding to the same effect as
the above are Shull vs. Sexton, 390 P. 2d 313 and Thurmon vs.
Skipton, 403 P. 2d 211.
Based upon all of the above authorities from Colorado,
Utah and elsewhere, it becomes obvious that the description
in the case before the court, that is "a cattle ranch and
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio
Blanco and Garfield Counties, Colorado," is legally sufficient
to compel specific performance of the contract.
POINT III
IF THERE IS ANY INSUFFICIENCY IN THE DESCRIPTION IT
HAS BEEN CURED BY DELIVERY OF POSSESSION AND OTHER PART
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT.
The evidence in this case conclusively showed that
defendants have taken possession of the entirety of Brady's
property and operated the cattle ranch since the very
inception of the agreement.

In addition, they have made

substantial lease payments under the lease option agreement.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

They have purchased and paid for the cattle.

And they have

made substantial improvements to the property.
It is generally recognized that a defective description
may be cured by putting the purchaser in possession.
Vendor and Purchaser, Section 8.

55 Am. Jur.,

In the case of Keepers vs. Yocum,

84 Kan. 554, 114 P. 1063, it was stated as follows:
"For another reason, the appellants1
contention must fail. A defective description of land in a contract of this
kind may be cured by putting the purchaser
in possession; that is, the parties may by
their own conduct under the contract render
certain what might otherwise be deemed uncertain. (Citation of authorities)
The finding of the court, which appears
to be sustained by the evidence, is that
the appellee placed the appellants in possession of the land in Missouri within a few days
after the contract was entered into, and they
continued in the possession thereof until
this action was brought. They disposed of a
team of horses and other personal property
included in the contract, received the owner's
share of the crops raised on the land, and did
all of these things after they knew that the
legal title to the land stood in the name of
Florence N. Briggs, and also after they knew
that there were certain apparent defects in
the title of the appellee which required
attention."
And in Monday vs. Irwin, 20 N.M. 43, 145 P. 1080, it was held:
"The argument of counsel is to the effect
that the contract is so indefinite and uncertain as to the description of the property
to be conveyed by plaintiff, and the complaint
so fails to supply the deficiency, that the
contract cannot be specifically enforced.
The description in the contract and complaint
is as follows:
'40 acres of land adjoining the town of
Hagerman and known as the Arnold Farms.1
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

The argument by counsel proceeds to the effect
that as 'there might have been a dozen 40-acre
tracts near Hagerman known as the Arnold Farms,
any one of which would have filled the description in the alleged contract and under the
allegations in the said complaint relative to
such description1, the description is insufficient. He cites authority to the effect that
if the complaint had alleged that there was
but one 'Arnold Farm1 adjoining Hagerman, or
that the parties verbally agreed upon the property which would suit the description, the objection would be overcome. (Citation of
authorities).
But counsel overlooked the finding of the
court that plaintiff had performed all of the
conditions of his contract, which includes the
putting of defendant into possession of the
property, thus identifying the premises. Under
such circumstances, the defect in the description
is curecL (Citation of authorities).
It, therefore, becomes unnecessary for us
to lay down any general rule as to the sufficiency of description of real estate, to
authorize the specific performance of contracts
for the sale thereof."
The above may be characterized as nothing more than
an application of the Doctrine of Part Performance to take
a .case out of the Statute of Frauds.

The reason that the

description is required to be in the contract in the first
place is merely to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

(See for

example, Calder vs. Third Judicial District Court, 2 Utah 2d
309, 273 P. 2d 168 where the court discusses the Statute of
Frauds as being the reason for the description to be required
in the written document.)

Both Utah and Colorado have

Statutes of Fraud requiring leases and contracts for interest
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in land to be in writing.

25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated;

38-10-108, Colorado Statutes.

Both jurisdictions, like-

wise, have statutory provisions relating to part performance.

Those provisions are as follows:
25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated: Nothing in
this chapter contained shall be construed
to abridge the powers of courts to compel
the specific performance of agreements in
case of part performance thereof.
38-10-110, Colorado Statutes: Nothing in
this article shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts of equity to compel
the specific performance of agreements in
case of part performance of such agreement.

The taking of possession under a contract, part payment of
purchase price, making of improvements, etc., are all singly
sufficient to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, let
alone the combination of these factors as exists in the
instant case.

See Siler vs. Investment Sec. Co., 125 Colo.

438, 244 P. 2d 877; Zamboni vs. Graham, 104 Colo. 23, 88 P. 2d
98; Barnes vs. Spangler, 98 Colo. 407, 56 P. 2d 31; Tolley vs.
Fritsinger, 150 Colo. 440, 374 P. 2d 364; Babcock vs. Bouton,
85 Colo. 327, 275 P. 908; Rupp vs. Hill, 149 Colo. 48, 367 P 2d.
746; Ridgeway vs. Pope, 163 Colo. 160, 430 P. 2d 77; VanTrotha vs.
Bamberger, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 883; Knoff vs. Grace, 68 Colo. 527,
190 P. 526; Brown vs. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400, 194 P. 943;
Hunt vs. Hayt, 10 Colo. 278, 15 P. 410; In re Roth's Estate,
2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P. 2d 278; Randall vs. Tracy Collins Trust
Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480; In re Madsen's Estate,
123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595.
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POINT IV
APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING ANY INVALIDITY
OF THE AGREEMENT BY REASON OF HIS INCONSISTENT POSITIONS AND
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS.
It is undisputed in this case that Fausett and Smith
have paid to Brady the total sum of $298,190.00 under the
contract.

It is also clear from the evidence that Fausett

and Smith were unwilling to purchase Brady's cattle, lease
his property, and make improvements to the land without
obtaining an option to purchase.

Brady now claims that he

is entitled to enforce the lease and retain all of the
benefits therefrom, and yet have no obligation on the option.
His position in court is to pick and choose those portions of
the contract that are the most advantageous to him and to
unilaterally excuse himself from those portions that he doesn't
want to perform.

Unfortunately in doing this he runs squarely

into the legal principle of estoppel.
As stated in 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver,
Section 59, estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance
of benefits from a transaction which might have otherwise
been avoided.

Numerous authority is cited for this concept

which is more fully explained as follows:
"This doctrine is obviously a branch of
the rule against assuming inconsistent
positions, and it has been said that such
cases are referable, when no fraud either
actual or constructive is involved, to the
principles of election or ratification,
rather than to those of equitable estoppel.
tThe result produced, however, is clearly the
same, and the distinction is not usually made.
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Such estoppel operates to prevent the party
thus benefited from questioning the validity
and effectiveness of the matter or transaction
insofar as it imposes a liability or restriction upon him, or in other words, it precludes
one who accepts the benefits from repudiating
the accompanying or resulting obligation."
Further explanation is made at Section 68, Am. Jur. 2d,
Estoppel and Waiver, wherein it is stated as follows:
"Generally speaking, a party will not be
permitted to maintain inconsistent positions
or to take a position in regard to a matter
which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent
with, one previously assumed by him, at least
where he had, or was chargeable with, full
knowledge of the facts, and another will be
prejudiced by his action. This principle
operates to preclude one who prevents a thing
from being done from availing himself of the
non-performance which he has himself occasioned.
Similarly, it operates to prevent a person from
taking advantage of his own wrong. It has also
been held to prevent one who has been wronged
in a transaction from subsequently impeaching
it after having recognized it as valid."
In the instant case the property covered by the lease
is exactly the same property as that covered by the option.
The option and lease are both part of the very same agreement.
The property is described in exactly the same manner as to
both.

Any Statute of Frauds defense would be equally applicable

to the five year lease as well as the option.

It is difficult

to conceive of a situation more inconsistent than the position
taken by the plaintiff in this case.

Legal principles of

estoppel and waiver are applicable to Statute of Frauds cases
as well as other types of cases 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds
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Sections 565 et seq, 570.
POINT V
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE LANDS WAS FULLY SUPPORTED BY
CONSIDERATION.
Appellants argument that the option portion of the
agreement is unsupported by consideration borders on the
ridiculous.

The option was part of an integrated contract,

for which plaintiff has already received consideration in
the amount of $298,190.00, not including the other covenants
and promises which themselves would constitute sufficient
consideration.

Again, as has been already pointed out in

other portions of this brief, the affirmative testimony of
Fausett was to the effect that he and Smith were not interested
in purchasing Brady's cattle or leasing the land without the
option to purchase.
It is simple hornbook law that one consideration may
be sufficient to support as many promises as are bargained
for (See Restatement of Contracts, Section 83).

Williston on

Contracts, 3rd Ed. Section 137 A in explaining this legal
concept cites the lease with option to purchase as a typical
illustration of one consideration supporting several promises.
If appellant's argument was adopted it would invalidate
thousands of lease option agreements in this state, a result
that would be absurd.
POINT VI
NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS CASE TO
SUPPORT ANY POSSIBLE FINDING OF INCAPACITY OR UNDUE INFLUENCE.
-25-
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After hearing all of the evidence in this case the
court made the following findings:
"Plaintiff was fully competent at the
time he entered into the agreement of
July 25, 1972; he was advised by competent
counsel;and he freely, voluntarily and
understandingly dealt with the defendants
in an arms-length transaction. There was
no fraud, undue influence, or any unconscionable advantage taken or committed by
the defendants in any manner whatsoever
(R-77)."
A summary of the evidence in support of the above finding
may be listed as follows:
1. Brady was represented by counsel
throughout the entire transaction.
2. Brady's counsel was called as a
witness in the case and there was no
suggestion from him whatsoever that Brady
was incapable of entering into a binding
contract.
3. The defendants Fausett and Smith
were not represented by counsel at any time
during the transaction.
4. Brady consulted with his accountant
prior to making the transaction.
5. Brady made self-serving statements
about being sick and exhausted and being
under the care of a doctor, yet not one shred
of medical testimony was offered at the trial.
6. Fausett affirmatively testified that
throughout the entire period of the negotiations there appeared to be nothing wrong with
Brady.
7. No evidence was ever presented, nor
was it ever suggested, that the purchase price
under the option was unfair.
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§. The evidence showed that Brady was
a sophisticated businessman, having been in
the sheep and cattle business many years,
and having bought and sold ranches and cattle
throughout his life.
9. There was no confidential or
fiduciary relationship existing between the
parties.
Based upon the above it would have been reversible error
for the court to have made any other finding than it did.
In order to find undue influence it must appear that the
free agency of the person influenced was taken away and in
its place the will of the defendant substituted 25 Am. Jur.
2d, Duress and Undue Influence Section 36. The evidence in
this case shows that if any undue advantage was taken at all
it was not by Fausett or Smith but by Brady himself who
induced the defendants into paying an inflated price for the
cattle and lease and then designably breached his agreement
on the option.
Aside from all of the above, the law is clear that a
contract made under undue influence is merely voidable and
capable of being ratified 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue
Influence Section 41. The undisputed evidence shows that the
agreement was ratified in the following respects:
1.

By accepting lease and cattle payments under the

contracts over a period of several years after the contract
was made, and during periods in which no undue influence was
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claimed or could possibly have been exerted.
2.

By the execution of a subsequent written agree-

ment wherein the parties "hereby adopt all of the provisions
of the initial contract and again reaffirm the same."
The evidence conclusively establishes a ratification
even if the trial court had made an adverse finding on the
undue influence issue (which it did not).
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, respondents respectfully request the court to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
David E. West
Ben E. Rawlings
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
John C. Beaslin
185 North Vernal Avenue, #1
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorneys for Respondents
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APPENDIX "A"
AGREEMENT TO SELL CATTLE
AND LEASE LAND WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE

THIS AGREEMENT made this 25th day of July, 1972, by and between LOWELL
L. BRADY, hereinafter called Sellen and GEORGE L. SMITH and JOHN E. FAUSETT,
'•'''•£

hereinafter called Buyers;
WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Seller is now the owner of certain cattle, a cattle ranch, and
range lands and Bureau of Land Management permits in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties,
Colorado, which he is desirous of selling, and;
WHEREAS, The Buyers are desirous of buying the cattle and leasing the said
lands and permits with an option to buy the same,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the Seller and Buyers
as follows:
1. That the Seller hereby agrees to sell to the Buyers, and the Buyers hereby
agree to buy from the Seller, the following described cattle at the prices shown:
Approximately 400 range cows, with 1972 calves by their
side (pairs), (it being understood by the parties hereto that
any calf born and following its mother prior to November
1, 1972, such cow and cali shall be designated a pair,
and that if calved after November 1, such cow shall be
considered a dry cow.)

$400,00 per pair
.

'
•

1S5 dry cows

„

26 bulls

•
•'.

* $280,00 per head
$500.00 per bull

It being understood that the above numbers are approximate but that it is all
the cattle the Seller has, and Buyers agree to take whatever number Seller
delivers to them. Provided unmerchantable cattle (which are sick or crippled)
shall not be covered by this agreement, and that should thereibe any steers
or yearling heifers gathered they are not covered by this agreement.
2. The Buyers agree to buy the above described cattle at the prices above
mentioned and to pay Seller therefor as follows:
$50,000.00 to be paid upon the execution of this agreement, and the balance
to be datermindd and paid at the time said cattle are delivered to Buyers-

^Ms
/.
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-23 . Seller agrees to deliver the said cattle at what is known as Seller's Homestead Ranch (the Daisy Kirk place) and to begin the delivery thereof as the cattle are .
gathered off the summer range, which shall be not later than November 1 # 1972. .
4 . The Buyers agree to receive the said cattle as gathered which shall not be
later than November 1, 1972, at the above designated place, or at such other place
as they may agree to with Seller, and as the cattle are delivered, the brand of the
Buyers will be placed on the cows and bulls, and the calves taken off the cows and
trucked away from the ranch. The cows and calves will be counted as the cows are
branded and as the calves are loaded in the trucks. It being understood that all calves
not loaded in trucks shall be the property of the Seller until delivered as above provided.
Provided, that all cattle later found not branded with Buyer's brand shall be the property
of Seller, and as they are found, they will be gathered and Seller notified so that he
may be present when they are branded, and when branded, he will be entitled to the
payment therefor in accordance with the above selling prices. It being understood
that Seller retains all right, title and interest in and to his brands.
• 5 . The Buyers agree that they will cooperate with the Seller in rounding up
the said cattle. It being understood by Buyers that the cattle are scattered over a
wide area of range, and that the roundup may take considerable time. Both Seller and
Buyers agree to supply the help necessary to make a complete ride of the range and
delivery of the cattle.
6. As a further consideration, Buyers agree to take immediate possession of
the said cattle and to, at their expense, herd, care for, and provide at least one
rider for the said cattle and do all things necessary to care for the said cattle in a
herdsmanlike manner, and to pay Seller for pasturage on the said cattle until November
1, 1972, $4.00 per month for each pair (cow with calf) and $3.50 per month for each
dry cow and bull, and to pay this pasture bill monthly beginning on August 3 1 , and
to pay on September 30 and October 3 1 . This pasture bill to be in lieu of interest on

W ^ j ?
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7 . SoAic:*" furtr.er agrees co and nerooy -eases to Buyers m e io*iGwmg cescribed
real property situated in I\io Blanco and Garfield Counties/ Colorado for a period of
five y e a r s , at an annual rernal of $25,CCC.C0 ^>o: year. The year's rental to be paid
on or before January 2, 1973, and on January 2 of every year thereafter during the five
year term or »ms ,».ease.

•

Description wix* oe p^scec nere.

Together with all improvements, appurtenances / rights of way, water
rignts anc grazing rignts tnereunto oo*or*gmg,
Reserving , however, to tne Seller, en.unaivided three-fourths interest
in whatever oi-., gas ana ozner minera* rignts he may now have in, upon,
or unaer tne a^ove c e s c n ^ e a -anas, togetner witn tne right of ingress
ana egress ior tne purpose ci exploration ana development of tne said
01^, g a s , ana ojner minora* rignts.
. S. Z!he Buyers agree to pay, in addition to the above mentioned annual r e n t a l ,
a.i reai estate t a x e s , as tne sarnie become cue and to pay the same promptly when due
so a s to not create a ±ien against tne said property, and to pay taxes on all personal
property that they may have on the said described property, beginning with the t a x e s
for 2973. Seller agrees to pay ! C / l 2 t h s of the taxes for 1972, and the Buyers agree
to pay 2 / l 2 : h s of 1572 t a x e s .
£». As a furtaor consideration of the soid l e a s e , Seller grants unto the 3uyers
an option to purcnase tne soovo a e s c n o e c property at tne Q'^d ox tne five-year l e a s e
p~r*oc, ma-._air.g a** improvements, appurtenances, rignts or way, water rights, and
*-.. gracing

.'^.MS,

ior *ne ^um or ^.iwv.-w^.C*. Buyers agree tnat upon the exercising

cf this option, the Buyers shall pay to the Seller 29 percent of the said $230, GOO. CO,
%..*** to pay tr.o oa*ur.co due in live e^ual payments beginning on January 2 , 1973.

-M
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n

-4buyers s n c * a*sc pay tne Sei.er interest on tne unpaid balances at the annuai race of
•i p«.«*can. more *.nan tne * oaera.. *r..'»crmeuiate o**carw *>inx 3 interest is lor tnat year.
10. The Buyers agree that in the event they exercise this option to purchase
the said property as described / they will, at that time, and upon the Buyer delivering
t o then; a Warranty Deed to the said property, to execute a Promissory Note and secure
the payment thereof by a "D^ed of Trust covering the above described property, water
ana range rignts •
ime is of the essence of this agreement, and should the Buyers fail to make

\

the payments as herein provided, then all payments made upon the execution of this
agreement or at any time suosec;uent thereto shall be considered a s rental and liQuidatedj
c»c»mages«
Ihe provisions of this agreement shall extend to tand.'bind, the legal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , a s s i g n s , and heirs of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITXZSS

V/HZAZOP,

the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and

year first above written.
4

/Lowell I^Erady, Seller

^-r~7/

'•tryy^-K.
G e o r g e ^ . Smiih', "*

^7 /
.y
«,<*«..**'

^J*

W/-.4

y> o

f -,.,

^c
»

jonn £.• aTousett, buyers

)
)

s*.

'

On this
day of July, IS''2, personally appeared before me Lowell L. Brady,
Z. -O-'vs L. w.*.*tn, Jonn ^ . r a u j e i t , tne parties to cne aoovo entit^ea Agreement wno
*«.'jOi*.o»*-,f ao.\nov/*owgea to me tnat tncy signea tne same.
•
•//,

•«.y vvitiiiuuu*1*-»•«

W*.-'*«V»*

<-/::• / . S>
Xotary Public
Residing at:
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